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  Daniel Conrad

Abstract
In a process of somatic evolution, the brain semi-randomly
generates initially-unstable neural circuits that are selectively
stabilized if they succeed in making sense out of raw sensory
input. The human aesthetic response serves the function of
stabilizing the circuits that successfully mediate perception and
interpretation, making those faculties more agile, conferring
selective advantage. It is triggered by structures in art and nature
that provoke the making of sense. Art is deliberate human action
aimed at triggering the aesthetic response in others; thus, if
successful, it serves the same function of making perception and
interpretation more agile. These few principles initiate a cascade of
emergent phenomena which account for many observed qualities
of aesthetics, including universality and idiosyncrasy of taste, the
relevance of artists’ intentions, the virtues of openness and
resonance, the dysfunction of formulaic art, and the fact that
methods of art correspond to modes of perceptual transformation.
Key Words
aesthetics, emergence, epigenesis, evolution of the aesthetic
response, intentionalism, neuronal group selection, open work,
perceptual transformation, stabilization of synapses

1. Looking for Commonalities
One of the most universal human traits is the aesthetic response.
All cultures have it, so it is conserved and may confer survival
value by serving a biological function. What is that function?
Beauty is found in painting, music, literature; but also in nature,
mathematics, physics. Do these have anything in common? By
triangulating, looking from many angles, we see commonalities.
In both art and nature, beauty always displays a provocative, often
novel, pattern or structure (in the broad sense, including texture,
colour, semantic pattern). It provokes ways of perceiving this
structure, transforming it to extract something significant. That act
of transformation is essential to the experience.
Start with art. Zola called art a corner of nature seen through a
“temperament."[1] This fits the Impressionist painting and
Naturalist literature of his time and perhaps all representational
art. But a general theory of aesthetics must explain not only
representational art but also abstract painting and music, neither
of which represents nature. Still, the idea of art looking through a
temperament (intuitive perceptual bias) makes sense. Kant[2] and
Croce[3] thought aesthetics depended on an intuitive sense of form
and that it gave insight into our perceptual faculties.
Clive Bell called art "significant form."[4] This is general enough;
music and abstract painting have form. But what is meant by
"significant?" Let us replace Bell’s undefined "significant" with
Zola's "temperament," and “form” with “structure.” Now if we add
our own observation (above) that beauty “provokes” modes of
perception, we might get: "structure which provokes a

temperament or an intuitive bias or way of looking." Does this
suggest a functional model?
Consider again music, poetry, painting, physics, biology. All have
structures (in the broad sense) that provoke specific faculties of
the mind: faculties that perceive and interpret, that find meaning
and pattern, that creatively organize and make sense of raw input.
And this provocation occurs through implied or explicit
transformations, even if this is a simple transformation of paint into
an image, metaphor into a resonant idea, or melody from a
sequence of tones. In the case of art, the structure is deliberate
and meant for an audience. In the case of nature, as Kant
observed, it gives the illusion of being deliberate.[5]
2. Perception and Interpretation
All perception requires transformations: when we see, we filter out
noise, fill in gaps, connect dots, rotate, stretch, juxtapose.
Perception is creative: different minds interpret similar input
differently. Perception is learned. Infants cannot see much until
they learn to see. The eye's signals must be processed and infants
learn to filter out noise, fill in gaps, integrate with other senses,
etc. until the output correlates with pre-existing patterns. There is
evidence for learning to see in adults also. Subjects made to wear
glasses which invert the world by 180 degrees are at first confused
but soon learn to make the needed perceptual transformations for
seeing upside-down.[6]
Some cultures, for example the Inuit, the Kwoma (New Guinea),
the Dogon (Mali), learn to see the natural world with great acuity.
From their sculpted masks in which nature and art cohabit, animals
and spirits emerge. These transformations have aesthetic power.
They occur in parts of the mind that perceive and interpret. When
we look at these masks, we are driven to make sense of them. And
as we make that sense, we become aware of the plasticity of
perception.
3. Survival Value
So we find provocative structure in all that stirs the aesthetic
response, and that structure coaxes us to make some kind
transformation, even if it is just paint forming an image. Is there
survival value in this response?
If, while walking through a northern temperate rainforest, you see
a vague shape in the fog, your brain tries to connect the dots, filter
the noise, crop, find patterns. If the shape is a bear, you might be
in danger. Learning to perceive vague or novel patterns has
survival value. If working with clay and pigment helps find ways of
recognizing bears in the fog, that has survival value. If it helps you
see the unforeseen, that is even better. Then recognizing bears in
clay can be pleasurable even when real bears are not.
4. A Possible Mechanism
If the aesthetic response triggered by structures (in our broad
usage, this term includes texture, detail, and semantic patterns) of
art and nature serves to enhance our perceptual faculties, how
does this work? I propose that aesthetic responses guide formation
of neural circuits that mediate perception and interpretation. Some
models of neural development hold that the cerebral cortex initially
forms circuits partly by chance, and useful circuits are then
stabilized by a selective process. Jean-Pierre Changeux calls this

model "epigenesis by selective stabilization of synapses."[7] Gerald
Edelman calls it the “theory of neuronal group selection.”[8] In
these models, brain anatomy is determined not only by genetics,
but epigenetically as well, by somatic natural selection, allowing
the brain to respond to unforeseen events. Hence, brains of
identical twins display different neural anatomy.
Initially, neurons migrate through the developing cortex forming
patterns partly by chance. They form groups, grow axons and
dendrites, and connect with other axons and dendrites. Junctions
between axons and other neurons or their dendrites form
synapses, where electrochemical signals pass. The resulting
network of synaptic circuitry is constantly changing and very
complex. There are roughly a quadrillion synapses in the brain.
In early neurogenesis cells migrate; some die, possibly by
selection. New axons, dendrites, and synapses form. Cognition is
minimal and newborns seem to move randomly. Then, speaking
hypothetically, circuits start to stabilize by a selective process:
when decisions lead to “favorable” outcomes, this stabilizes circuits
mediating those decisions. In like manner, “unfavorable” outcomes
destabilize circuits. Circuit formation and selection continue (more
slowly) in adults. Useless circuits are pruned and replaced with new
ones; useful circuits are stabilized.
What selective criteria determine “favorable” outcomes? These are
“values,” such as thirst, hunger, and sex, that originate in primitive
areas of the brain, such as the hypothalamus, and are triggered by
external stimuli. I posit there is an internal, “disinterested”[9]
value felt as pleasure that rewards making sense of sensation and
that helps to stabilize circuits that successfully mediate perception
and interpretation. Thus, when we use novel, unstable circuits to
make sense (to recognize patterns that match some of the
patterns stored in our memories, or which match hard-wired
patterns[10]) we feel a disinterested pleasure whose biochemical
and biophysical manifestations stabilize those same perceptual
circuits. That pleasure, I propose, is the aesthetic response.
This model is Darwinian: survival of the fittest acts as a selective
mechanism. However, unlike phylogenetic evolution, it works
somatically, as it does in the immune system and self-learning
computer programs. Unlike a phylogenetic population, the brain
does not expand indefinitely, however its repertoire of responses
does expand indefinitely. It continually spawns trillions of random
circuits that are then challenged by encounters with worldly
experience, generating sensory input. And those transformational
circuits which successfully make sense of that input are stabilized
by the biochemical and biophysical constituents of aesthetic
pleasure. Thus, perception grows progressively more versatile. And
since newly stabilized circuits connect in parallel with older ones,
the system builds on previous success.
5. Some Empirical Observations Supporting the Model
Consider some of the most basic methods in art making: concision,
elaboration, outline, theme and variation, symmetry, balance,
juxtaposition, synaesthesia, harmony, dissonance, metaphor,
metonymy, symbols, etc. These methods are modes of perceptual
transformation: filtering out noise, filling in gaps, connecting the
dots, rotating, stretching, juxtaposing, etc. In our model, pleasure
is found in these perceptual transformations, even when the thing
perceived is unpleasant. As Kant argued, beauty is not appetite

and not always lyrical: some artists (Sophocles, Brecht, Grosz)
show painful, corrupt, ugly parts of life. In each case, we learn new
ways to make sense and become increasingly aware of the
plasticity of our perceptions.
What about aesthetic pleasures stirred by nature? Einstein found
the universe beautiful, calling himself an artist of physics. Some
people find astro-photography beautiful, as well as the natural
wilderness landscape. In the absence of urban culture, wilderness
can seem to take form intentionally, only there is no artist. The
sense of purpose in these things is unmistakable.
In evolution, life develops seemingly purposeful forms like the
forms of animist art. Jacques Monod called this illusion of purpose
"teleonomy."[11] To him, life arose from a balance between chaos
and order. This mix of spontaneity and composition is the kernel of
the unity between forms of beauty. Gerald Mast calls it "surprising
inevitability."[12] Biologists talk of "emergent properties" (I use
the term in its most conservative sense, implying the
unpredictability of certain synergies, not invoking additional
physical laws). So Kant’s tenet that nature was beautiful because it
displayed a sense of purpose, though it had no purpose
(Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck), is, essentially, Monod's teleonomy.
Art also has emergent properties. Cézanne painted nature without
contrivance, yet he followed compositional rules, as if nature were
composed. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who held that perception was a
creative act, said that Cézanne “...wanted to depict matter as it
takes on form, the birth of order through spontaneous
organization."[13] His forms rose from a balance between chaos
and order, as Monod describes the spontaneous emergence of life.
In The Art of the Fugue, Bach stated themes and then transformed
them using compositional techniques inversion, retrogression, and
transposition. Yet his emergent forms are not completely
predictable from the rules. This surprising inevitability reveals
higher rules, implying a purpose. Music provokes making-sense
without representing a specific world (though perhaps it
“represents” imagination), yet conveys a sense of purpose. No
actual purpose, of course, is revealed.
6. The Virtues of Ambiguity and Openness
Is this non-revelation important? Borges suggested that the
aesthetic experience is the “...imminence of a revelation that is not
yet produced,"[14] implying that the search for sense is richer
than the finding of it. Mallarmé concurred, observing that to name
is to destroy; to suggest is to dream.[15] Baudelaire said that
beauty is vague, thus allowing broad interpretation.[16]
Accordingly, while there are general principles in aesthetics, there
is no evidence for universal formulae for making art or judging
beauty. Formulae rob art of ambiguity, emergent properties, and
surprising inevitability. Real art helps the mind develop perceptual
modes that adapt to handle the unforeseen. (See section 11.)
Similarly, meaning, in the sense of a moral or a message, is not a
good criterion. Beauty may train the mind to construct meaning
from chaos, but that does not always require a fixed meaning or
“point.” In our model, rather than always asking what art means,
we ask what it does, what its effects are. Critic Adam Gopnik,
paraphrasing John Updike, observes, “[P]urposes are not points,
...where the purpose of ‘King Lear’ was to purge the soul with pity

and terror, its point was that old men should not retire
prematurely.”[17]
How, then, does the artist employ meaning? Artists try to convey
an intent or vision, to have an effect on the audience, but this does
not always carry a fixed meaning. Meaning, in the sense of
message, is not always there; and when it is, it may or may not be
vital to the effect. Renaissance paintings of religious themes do not
necessarily affect us through their theology. Bach’s fugues do not
sound Protestant as opposed to Catholic. Delacroix’s La liberté
guidant le peuple is arguably weakened by its overt propaganda.
By contrast, the political meaning of Goya’s May 3rd is central to
his intent. And in Orson Welles’s Citizen Kane, the meaning of
Kane’s dying word, “rosebud,” is vital to the film.
The artist’s intent is to provoke us to perceive in certain ways.
Meaning is vital only to the extent that it participates in that
provocation. But even then, meaning is not the whole story. If
Kane’s “rosebud” were just narrative meaning, the film would be a
mere parable with a moral. The slow discovery of meaning,
however, to which “rosebud” is the climax, is deeply aesthetic. The
process of discovery reveals the artistic intent, and “rosebud” is as
much a part of the structure of the film as is the color magenta in
one of Monet’s nymphaeas.
Akira Kurosawa’s Rashomon also involves a search for meaning,
but the meaning is left open. When using semantic openness,
artists evoke multiple layers of possible interpretation without a
fixed meaning. The intent is to provoke the audience to make their
own interpretations, thereby collaborating in the final stage of
creation: Kafka’s The Castle and Beckett’s Waiting for Godot offer
multiple interpretations. Expressionist painters often omit facial
details; the viewer supplies them. In film, consider Kurosawa’s
Dreams and the ending of Kubrick’s 2001.
In semantic openness, art is left undefined and contingent, to be
completed by chance events or the audience. In China, this
characteristic dates at least to the Zhou dynasty. In the West, it
starts (arguably) in the nineteenth century (Turner, Baudelaire)
with the idea that experience is irretrievable, so rather than render
it directly, artists turn inward to themselves, the medium, or the
mind of the audience. Umberto Eco called it “open work.”[18]
Calvino spoke of “multiplicity.”[19] Borges reinvented it continually
as a book that changes meaning as it changes authors, an endless
lottery, a book of sand, an infinite library.[20] Yasunari Kawabata,
whose stories are often unfinished, spoke of “emptiness,” by which
he meant not nihilism but something deeper, full of “sensuous
fantasy.”[21]
7. Structural Openness and Aesthetic Darwinism
There is also a non-semantic route to openness: the structure can
be left open. Key elements can be left to chance, improvised, or
constructed by audiences. Consider improvisational theatre, jazz,
interactive art, and the art of Alexander Calder and Merce
Cunningham. Results spawned by chance improve the odds of
finding the surprise of “surprising inevitability,” but may lower the
odds of finding the inevitability. This requires balance: random
chaos is dull, because if everything is permitted, nothing can
surprise.
Some artists use hybrid methods, first improvising, then selecting

what works. This “aesthetic Darwinism” reveals provocations they
could not invent unaided, allowing them to transcend prior
experience. For example, Joseph Chaikin’s Open Theater
workshops used an improvisation exercise called “transformation”
in which actors were urged to spontaneously change characters
mid-scene. Successful segments were selected and scripted.
Megan Terry’s plays Keep Tightly Closed in a Cool Dark Place and
Calm Down Mother were developed this way. Though ultimately
scripted, they maintained a sense of spontaneity.
Hamlet said that art holds a mirror to nature. This metaphor is not
confined to realism. Mirroring nature can mean copying its images
but can also mean copying its methods. When we let chance drive
some elements of artistic creation and then select from the
resulting pool of possibility the forms that best fit our needs, we
use nature’s methods. Perhaps most artists work this way,
imagining possibilities randomly, rejecting useless ones, keeping
what works. Audiences can also do this, particularly with open
work. Since open work gives no fixed interpretation, this
experience may be more realistic than “closed” art.
Closed or open, art presupposes an artist with a purpose or intent.
This implies a promise to make sense, and often a promise to
make more sense over time, which is a good definition of “depth.”
Closed art promises a fixed interpretation or way of making sense.
Open art promises multiple ways of making sense. Nature, of
course, is open, though we are continually trying to close it.
8. Unity and Intent
Another way to say that nature’s beautiful forms display the
illusion of purpose is that nature seems to have unity. In science, a
“beautiful” theory unifies multiple phenomena with a single concise
law, model, or set of equations. In art, artists have a real purpose:
an intent. When the intent is perceived by an audience, it can
invest a work of art with a sense of unity.[22] Finding this unity is
a way of making sense, seeing patterns, so the art clearly fits our
functional model.
In time-based art, unity may arise from sequence. We watch films
and plays from beginning to end; unity suffers if we start in the
middle. In novels, unity might come from plot, character
development, or theme. In painting or sculpture, unity is ostensibly
seen all at once in the structure, so it might be damaged by
cropping. In fact, in much visual art (e.g., Picasso’s cubist painting
or late work by Bonnard), deeper unity is perceived gradually, as
in time-based art.
In open art, such as Calder’s mobiles, perception is labile, changing
constantly. This does not always harm unity, since that continual
change may be inherent in the intent. Similar logic applies to
improvisation. And for art using aesthetic Darwinism, the intent
drives the selective process. In all these cases, if the audience
grasps the intent, that itself may endow the work with unity.
Finding the artist’s intent while searching for unity is a strong way
of making sense.
Thus, openness and unity are not contradictory. The artist’s intent
can unify even when it does not aim at a unitary voice or
interpretation. Multi-vocal, polysemic art can convey a deep
central purpose or perspective. Few novels are as multi-vocal as
Joyce’s Ulysses. Each chapter is written in a different style. Multiple

languages and myths intermingle. Yet the work holds together
despite its multiplicity, and it arguably presents a unique point of
view.
9. Resonance and Bricolage
Multiplicity is closely linked to a sister-idea: resonance. In art,
symbols (including symbolically charged characters) and
metaphors may lack fixed referents. This freedom can make them
more adaptable, enabling them to serve multiple uses within a
work of art and travel to other works. The light in Goya’s Third of
May recurs in Picasso’s Guernica. Kafka’s castle, Virginia Woolf’s
lighthouse, and Jeanne d’Arc display similar adaptive depth. By
analogy to vibrating strings, we can call this sympathetic excitation
“resonance.” Since it leads to qualities like symmetry, metaphor,
parallelism, etc., resonance is central to the perceptual process.
In biology, also, themes repeat, serving different purposes in
different contexts. François Jacob termed this “bricolage”
(tinkering), and found it ubiquitous in evolution; e.g., microtubules
shape cytoskeletons, move organelles, mediate mitosis, form cilia
and flagellae, etc. By bricolage, transformational circuits used in
one kind of perception might be useful in other kinds as well.
There is evidence for this cross-modal wiring. Patients blind from
childhood, whose eyes are surgically repaired, take months to
learn to “see.” Yet Oliver Sacks tells of one such patient who, prior
to training, could tell time on a clock; he previously used a watch
with no glass, which he read by touch.[23] Similarly, he could see
the letters of the alphabet whose shapes he had learned by touch.
Thus, relevant circuits from one modality can aid perception in
another.
When circuits developed for one purpose are used for another, this
“bricolage” may be mediated by parallel links with distant circuits.
While the primary function of this cross-wiring may have more to
do with basic perception than manipulation of symbols, it may
explain the “resonant” transferability of symbols and metaphors,
and the high incidence of synaesthesia in artists.
These parallel networks are essential for perception. The eye is not
a video camera nor the ear a recorder; nothing is captured whole.
Instead, different sense organs make multiple, disjunctive
samplings of the environment. These samplings are routed to
various “maps” (groups of related neurons that sample similar
qualities), and those maps are interconnected. Instead of rendering
simulacra, the different maps specialize in measuring individual
properties, such as bumpiness, orientation, contrast, tone, contour,
outline, key detail, colour, rhythm, volume, timbre, etc. The brain
then integrates the samplings of these individual maps to
“perceive” the environment. The interconnections (between maps)
that mediate this integration, are dense, complex, and parallel.
10. Music
If symbols achieve resonance by adaptable, multiple references,
then music, whose reference to the environment is abstract,
should be highly resonant. It is. Music connects convincingly to
the pool of human experience despite its lack of depiction. Music
seems mostly to affect attitudes and emotions, which are not
representations of the world but responses to prior perceptions of
that world. In film, for example, music usually does not describe

events but, through resonance, tells the audience how to feel about
them. How might this work?
Music is sound organized for aesthetic effect, usually in tones, each
with a dominant frequency (plus timbre). This in itself is aesthetic.
Tones can be sequenced into melody, rhythm, and various kinds of
repetition. Other tones join to make harmony and counterpoint. In
complex music, composers transform the melodies by
compositional techniques such as inversion (turning upside-down),
retrogression (turning backwards), transposition to other keys,
canon, stretto (rapidly-layered canon), augmentation (lengthening
each note proportionally), etc.
Thus, when we make sense of music, we learn which pattern may
apply to other non-representational patterns (e.g., emotions).
These patterns may be useful for re-interpreting or reinforcing
emotional links to other neural areas. This kind of recursive, crossmodal facility may explain not only how music connects with
emotions but how it might enhance other mental functions. [24] It
may even explain how Beethoven could write his late quartets
when he was deaf, conduct performances guided only by watching
the movements of the bows, and inspire one critic to prefer the
written score of Die Grosse Fuge to its live performance.[25]
In sum, I propose that music provokes abstract ways of ordering,
of extracting sense (particularly emotional sense) from chaos. It
rewards this sense-making with pleasure, stabilizing circuits, and
some of that transformational circuitry will then be useful in
making sense of non-musical experience.
Here is a specific example. Beethoven’s late quartets, written when
he was deaf, are often extremely dissonant. Elaine Pagels, author
of The Gnostic Gospels, relates that she “...spent about two years
listening to them obsessively after the death of my husband. I
couldn't listen to anything else, because Bach was too harmonious.
What they did is what George Fox, who founded the Quaker
movement, says that the holy spirit does. They spoke to my
condition.”[26]
This “speaking” uses music’s capacity to provoke the making of
emotional sense in individuals. Such responses are not necessarily
universal. Ornette Coleman has said that his highly idiosyncratic
and dissonant music must make sense because he can hear when
he makes mistakes, yet not all listeners like his music. As an Arabic
saying goes, on the taste of coriander, no two agree.
11. Universality and Idiosyncrasy
Our model predicts this idiosyncrasy: different life experiences will
generate polymorphic neural circuitry. Yet Kant held that
aesthetics, while subjective and intuitive, had universality, and this
is often observed. (To Kant, intuition is innate, while in our model
it is learned. But in both cases it refers to a kind of judgment
whose opposite is deliberation.[27]) Taste varies yet beauty can be
shared. If not, making art would be pointless. Can universality and
idiosyncrasy be reconciled?
One hypothesis is that it takes experience to appreciate some
works of art or nature. Stendhal wrote The Red and the Black for
“the happy few,” knowing it would take decades to be accepted.
Van Gogh was unsuccessful in his lifetime. Beckett’s Waiting for
Godot was initially panned. When Ornette Coleman started his

career, nightclub clients used to physically eject him, along with his
brass saxophone, breaking it. He finally bought an unbreakable
fiberglass instrument.
In corroboration of this hypothesis, in art, ontogeny can
recapitulate phylogeny. One does not start a child’s musical
education with Beethoven’s Die Grosse Fuge. A wiser plan might
go: Gregorian chant, Renaissance polyphony, Bach, Mozart,
Beethoven’s early, middle, and late quartets, and finally Die Grosse
Fuge. Thus broader, deeper exposure to art might increase the
incidence of universality.
By contrast, many children and naive viewers appreciate Kwoma,
Inuit, and Dogon masks, and sculpture by Rodin and Henry Moore.
Many naive listeners like complex East Indian ragas. We can argue
over whether children understand Moore’s worldly references or
whether naive listeners can distinguish morning from evening
ragas, but is that cultural knowledge essential for appreciating
some universal qualities of art?
We have already explained idiosyncrasy: differences in life
experience generate polymorphic neural circuits. Then how do we
account for universality? It likely arises from convergent evolution,
the process which generated the striking similarities of human eyes
to octopus eyes, despite five hundred million years of divergence.
Our model posits somatic (rather than phylogenetic) evolution, but
convergence still applies. Since the selective pressures on
individual perceptual abilities have strong commonalities, we
expect that different circuits can yield similar outcomes.
Since judging and creating share circuits (artists judge work as
they make it), this universality suggests that art might be made by
formula. As noted in Section 6, I reject this. Contrived formulae,
like those for Harlequin romances, yield shallow art. Can our model
generate better formulae to simulate aesthetic intuition and make
art? Could such art help us recognize the unforeseen?
Aesthetic intuition is a product of the integrated brain, distributed
across many parallel circuits. It is not analyzable in the way one
analyzes an automobile, whose few components yield easily
predictable outcomes. The brain employs trillions of small,
polymorphic components, and its complexity is enhanced by
recursive circuitry, capable of self-organization. Thus, we can treat
aesthetic intuition as an emergent property of a complex system
that can learn to interpret the unforeseen but cannot be reduced
to a simple formula. We can surmise its origins and describe its
general features, but we cannot predict its specific outcomes from
first principles.
12. Aircraft Simulators, Catharsis, and Cargo Cults
If intuition is the central faculty for judging beauty and making art,
its opposite, contrivance, is responsible for much shallow art and
for some art that is not even meant to affect audiences. We do
not, of course, preclude using standard forms like the sonnet, the
fugue, or the Greek tragedy. These are not prescriptive or
mechanical; they require intuition for proper use.
Consider drama. For Aristotle the function of tragedy was
catharsis: purging viewers’ minds with terror and pity.[28] This
“aircraft-simulator” model offers risk-free, imagined disaster but
does not actually simulate reality. It condenses, abstracts, and

transforms it. It seeks primarily not to teach modes of behavior
(though it may do that) but to teach more general ways of
abstracting and transforming sorrow. So rather than simply
judging how a play contrives to follow the rules (e.g. unity,
melody, meter, tragic flaws, etc.), we should first judge how it
fulfills its function.
Shakespeare uses different methods. He is interested less in pity
and terror and more in complexity of character and how truth hides
below the surface. He employs few fixed rules. His tragedies tend
to follow Aristotle, and his character revelations often emerge in
wilderness, e.g, in The Tempest, Midsummer Night’s Dream, King
Lear, Macbeth. But Hamlet is not very Aristotelian in structure and
it does not employ wilderness. Its truth is buried but compelling,
so we try to understand the Prince’s deep struggle with truth,
illusion, and his own existence. In the process, we find ways of
digging at truth, illusion, and identity.
Now consider contrivance. In World War II, the Allies built air
bases in the South Pacific to fly in cargo for the war, and employed
many islanders. Some thought they were gods from the sky. After
the war, the Allies went home. Some islanders formed "cargo cults"
to lure the cargo back. They constructed mock landing strips to
attract aircraft. Some were convincing reproductions, and a few
pilots, low on fuel, attempted emergency landings. The mock
runways were not suitable for real aircraft, and some pilots
crashed, spilling their cargo.
Some art is made with art history or ideology in mind. From
theory, artists predict the next stage of art and then contrive ways
to satisfy those theoretical needs. If aesthetic intuition then
prevails, all may be well. But if the contrivance takes precedence,
as so often happens, and the artist tries only to satisfy theory,
then the art becomes a kind of cargo cult, and the audience is
cheated.
In a related vein, Landolfi tells of a poet who diligently learns
Persian from an old, multilingual sea captain.[29] Then he writes
his life’s work: three brilliant poems in his beloved, new language.
He soon discovers this language is not Persian, but the captain’s
own twisted, idiomatic, private language, invented in long, feverish
sea voyages. And during the years of writing, even the captain has
forgotten it. Landolfi’s gedanken-experiment parodies hermetic,
“audience-less” art.
13. Some Useful Methods
As noted, our caution against formulae does not preclude flexible
standard forms (the sonnet, the fugue) or basic methods (rhythm,
meter, canon). These help create unity and pattern. But beyond
that, some basic methods are more than just formal devices; they
aid the creative process. Regarding the sonnet, writer John Gray
recalls Freud’s idea (borrowed from Schiller) that creativity
requires relaxing inhibitions.[30] All visions must pass a guard at
the gate to the mind before you can see them. The guard blocks
what is foolish. Artists learn to distract the guard, sift through their
visions, and select what is useful. The form of the sonnet, Gray
suggests, slips contraband words past the guard. They pass
(temporarily) because they rhyme and fit the meter.
Similar ways of opening the creative imagination include Joseph
Chaikin’s “transformation” exercise, Braque’s and Picasso’s

methods of collage, and the dreams of the Surrealists. Dreams are
of particular interest, as they may be enriched for precisely those
“inappropriate” associations normally blocked by the guard at the
gate.[31] All these methods introduce unedited randomness, so
they tend to work best when followed by selection that is guided by
aesthetic intuition. Neglect or failure of the selection process may
lead to useless noise.
14. Interaction with the Physical Medium
The artists’ intent does not pass to audiences directly but through
physical media. These media can play a key creative role.
Rembrandt and Hals, for example, show the paint’s texture,
forming a second expressive level to the image. Crosstalk between
levels is part of the sense they make. Working closely with the
physical media is also a way to play with random variation.
Jackson Pollock certainly had rich conversations with the partlyrandom physical paint.
Some of the most intense play between artists and physical media
occurs in East Asian pottery and ceramics, epitomized by Tang
dynasty glazed figures, Song dynasty Jun and Ru ware, and
Koetsu’s seventeenth century Raku. The underlying chemical and
physical processes are very complex. There is much random
chance in the production process and the work seems accidental,
yet at the same time it renders a striking illusion of purpose, as if
the glaze had a will. This illusion recalls Kant’s account of nature’s
beauty, only here there are two illusions: the illusion of purpose
regarding nature, and the illusion of pure accident regarding the
artist, who actually has a lot of control over this partly random
process through intuitive mastery.
This tension between accident and design sits at the heart of
aesthetics, uniting the responses to art and nature, even in art
which is completely controlled by the artist (since the audience still
has to make a bridge between chaos and order). We see this at its
purest, perhaps, in the simple act of bringing bits of nature indoors
for aesthetic ends. Chinese scholars practiced this alternative to
mimesis, collecting natural Lingbi and Taihu rocks for their elegant,
accidental forms. When contemplated by the collector, such a rock
is nature; when deliberately shown to a guest, it is art. Some
photography likewise “collects” accidental natural forms. Below are
two photographs of littoral sand formations showing biomorphic
resonance in the traces left by the outgoing tide.
Resonant forms in nature: traces of the outgoing tide in the sand,
photographed by Daniel Conrad
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15. Evolutionary Advantages of the Aesthetic Response
Our model’s few precepts may explain the original function of the
aesthetic response to art and nature, but other uses of art have

emerged. Ellen Dissanayake makes a well-supported argument
that art serves the key social role of “making special,” of investing
certain phenomena with special significance.[32] Daniel Levitin’s
insightful analysis of music[33] reviews its possible evolutionary
origins, including its important role (along with dance) in mate
selection, one of Darwin’s suggestions.[34] These key functions of
art are consistent with our model, which predicts that such uses
would arise by bricolage.
Other models propose that some patterns are hard-wired for
recognition. This seems an inefficient use of genes, but there is
precedent. Some birds show innate fear of the shadows of specific
predators.[35] While such models possess less plasticity, they do
not contradict our model. In fact, if some patterns were hardwired, it would help the early perceptual system judge when useful
patterns were being recognized, speeding the system’s maturation.
Denis Dutton argues cogently for a version of this model in which
landscape features of desirable habitats were hard-wired into our
perceptual faculties in the Pleistocene epoch.[36]
All these models (including ours) imply we may find hints of the
aesthetic in other animals. Such hints include chimpanzees who
admire sunsets[37] and elephants who paint.[38] Willem de
Kooning admired some of the elephant drawings. When told where
they came from, he remarked, “That’s a damn talented elephant!”
One virtue of evolutionary models is that they let us evaluate art
by its function. In our model, we ask if the art evokes disinterested
aesthetic pleasure (excluding work based on desire, such as wishfulfillment fantasies, pornography, or fast food ads), and if it
enhances the way we perceive and interpret. Ratings, box office
numbers, and focus groups are useless here. Also, personal
judgment is different from judging for exhibition to a large
audience over time. Education, experience, and broad exposure to
art are vital; so again, ratings do not help. Artist-run juries are
useful, but juries should judge whether the work can enhance the
way we perceive, rather than using formulaic or hedonistic criteria.
We also must be careful how we interpret the above word
“enhance.” D.W. Griffith’s racist film, The Birth of a Nation, while
innovative, had so hateful and shallow a world-view that it led to a
resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan and a multitude of lynchings and
murders. Instead of giving audiences deeper, more agile modes of
perception, this film made them stupider and nastier. Restrictive
prejudices (sexism, racism, homophobia, anti-semitism) are not
enhancements. In like manner, TV commercials, though they may
engage aesthetic sensibilities, usually work poorly as art. Instead
of enhancing our modes of perception, they seek to impoverish
perceptual faculties, focusing them on body odor or limp hair.
Good art enriches our perceptive repertoire. Beyond seeing bears
through the fog, it can reveal a culture alienated from nature. John
Berger relates an experience of metaphysical exhaustion he had in
Amsterdam.[39] He had lost the power to name, form
associations, or see meaning. In despair, he entered the van Gogh
museum and encountered the paintings. In a surge of
psychological transformation, the paintings restored his mind. By
strange coincidence, Hugo von Hofmannsthal wrote of an almost
identical experience in 1907 with some of the same paintings.[40]
Given the effects of art on individuals, how does art affect the
broader culture? We would expect cultures that suppress art (North

Korea, the Khmer Rouge, the Taliban) to grow narrow-minded and
atrophy, whereas cultures that actively support the arts may
develop more adaptable minds and thus have better chances of
surviving unforeseen technological, ecological, and social changes.
In this context, the art of our time could serve a survival function.
How well our do our dominant systems of producing art, which give
rise to so much formulaic commercial entertainment, serve that
function?[41]
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